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TRESPASS TO LAND IN NORTH CAROLINAi
PART I. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW
DAN B. DOBBS*
Scholars have traditionally looked upon trespass to land as
a relatively simple tort. This analysis of North Carolina case law
suggests that the law of trespass to land may be more complex
than heretofore believed. The author discusses the degree of
"fault" necessary to create liability, the types of interests pro-
tected (both possession and ownership), the extent of liability for
unintended consequences, and the several privileges that. will
excuse an intrusion upon the land of another.
INTRODUCTION
Trespass to land cases deal with an ancient and simple tort-un-
authorized intrusion, usually intentional, upon land owned or possessed
by another. But analysis in these cases is to some extent a mirror to
analysis in many other tort cases. There is, first of all, the traditional
issue about the basis of liability: is defendant liable only for an intended
intrusion, for a negligent one, or even for an unintended one? This, of
course, is the same kind of question raised about any tort. Second,
again as with other torts, it is important to identify the interests. that
the law seeks to protect, so that the law can be adjudged and applied
with good sense. Third, there is the omnipresent question of the extent
of the defendant's liability: will he be held liable, for example, for un-
intended and unforeseen consequences of his trespass? Finally, there is
the problem of balancing the interests of society at large against the
interests of the particular plaintiff-again, an issue running through
all torts in various guises. In the "intentional tort" cases it is usually
raised as a question of "privilege," or as a layman might say, a question
of "good excuse." What follows is a survey of these and closely related
issues, with a discussion of remedies for trespass postponed for con-
sideration in Part II.**
Copyright 1968 by Dan B. Dobbs. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Visiting Professor, Cornell
Law School, 1968-69.
** Part II will be published in the second issue 9f Vlutre 47,
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INTENT, NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
Until recent years, the common law imposed liability for trespass to
land even where the defendant was wholly without fault.1 It is now
generally accepted that some form of "fault" is ordinarily the basis of
liability in trespass, and normally this is intent.2 It must be recognized,
however, that "fault" is rather artificially defined, and that there are ex-
ceptional cases in which liability may be imposed without any fault at
all.3
There need be no intent to injure or cause damages,4 though normal-
ly, at least, the entry upon the land must be intentional or the result of
negligence. In Smith v. Pate,5 the defendant allegedly allowed his car
to run onto the plaintiff's land, damaging the plaintiff's building. The
defendant answered alleging an unavoidable accident-that is, that the
accident occurred without fault. The Court held that such a defense
was a good one, stating that fault in the form of intent or negligence
was appropriate.' Thus there is ordinarily no liability for purely acci-
dental intrusion.
The rule is different, however, where the intrusion is intentional but
mistaken, or at least it was traditionally different. The intent required
to impose liability is intent to act in relation to the land or some land,
not an intent to do evil. Thus if the defendant believes Blackacre to
belong to him and he intentionally goes on the land, he is a trespasser
if he is mistaken about the ownership, and he is liable though he is
certainly no wrongdoer in any moral sense7 Presumably this is the law
'See Newsom v. Anderson, 24 N.C. 42 (1841).
'See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965).
'Extra-hazardous activities: See Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co.,
260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963). Absolute duties: Apparently there were
certain absolute duties with respect to drainage, and these probably still exist
apart from statute. See Clark v. Patapsco Guano Co., 144 N.C. 64, 56 S.E. 858
(1907) (rights to natural drainage of land); see also Masten v. Texas Co., 194
N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927). Unjust enrichment: Where defendant profits from
the trespass, he should disgorge the profits even though he did not intend the
trespass. See Part II.
' Cases sometimes speak loosely about this. See, e.g., Hogwood v. Edwards,
61 N.C. 350 (1867).
246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957). See also Schloss v. Hallman, 255 N.C.
686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961).
246 N.C. at 66, 97 S.E.2d at 459.
'Where the vendor of land sells the wrong land or points out the wrong
boundaries and the purchaser, so misled, trespasses, both the vendor and purchaser
may be held liable. See notes 19-20 infra. These cases appear to rest upon the
principle that a mistaken trespass is no defense. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND)
OF ToRTs § 164 (1965).
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of North Carolina because there is a statute' that assumes such a rule.
The statute apparently does, however, limit liability in such "mistake"
situations to actual damages, so that no damage can be recovered unless
pecuniary harm is done. It is arguable that Smith v. Pate' changed
the old common law rule by requiring intent or negligence as a basis of
liability. The Restatement of Torts, on which the Court relied in Smith,
however, adopts both the view that "fault" is normally required,"' and
the view that mistake of ownership is no defense.' 2 This is consistent
with the more or less traditional assumption that the intent required is
not an intent to do wrong, but merely an intent to act as distinct from
an involuntary or accidental movement.' The existence of a statute
based upon the rule that mistake is no defense seems to reinforce the
same conclusion. In this sense, at least, fault does not seem to be re-
quired: a defendant is liable for an intrusion that he intends, though
he reasonably believes the land is his own.
It is also true that the defendant need not have a purpose of trespass-
ing, nor even an intent to intrude upon the plaintiff's land, provided he
intends an act he knows will almost certainly involve an intrusion.14
In Pegg v. Gray,'5 the defendant kept a pack of foxhounds and ran them
in fox hunts. Foxes frequently ran across the crop lands and grazing
lands of the plaintiff, and the hounds damaged crops and stampeded cattle
in chasing them. The defendant was held liable for the trespass. The
Court thought the evidence sufficient to support a finding that defendant
either intentionally sent the dogs on plaintiff's lands or "released them
knowing they likely would go on, over, and across the lands... ."' Thus
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-543 (1953).
'The statute requires that the trespass be "involuntary" or by "negligence."
This has been held to cover cases in which defendant mistakes the boundary.
Blackburn v. Bowman, 46 N.C. 441 (1854).
10246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 166 (1965).12Id. § 164.
1 Some courts and writers have expressed this conception of intent by saying
only that a voluntary act is required of the defendant. E.g., McDermott v. Sway,
78 N.D. 521, 50 N.W.2d 235 (1951); Buchanan v. Cardozo, 24 App. Div. 2d
620, 262 N.Y.S.2d 247, inodified, 16 N.Y.2d 1029, 213 N.E.2d 317, 265 N.Y.S.2d
908 (1965) (court of appeals held the falling of a retaining wall was a con-
tinuing trespass, not just a nuisance).
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 8A (1965). A leading case is
Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), involving trespass
to person, where defendant-child removed a chair as plaintiff was sitting down,
without purpose to cause harm, but knowing that plaintiff would almost certainly
fall. Liability was imposed.1240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954), noted in 33 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1954).
10 240 N.C. at 555, 82 S.E.2d at 762.
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either intent or negligence appeared to be established, and either is suffi-
cient. Pegg v. Gray, of course, does not hold that dog owners are liable
for the trespass of their dogs, and normally there is no liability for
depredations of otherwise "reputable dogs," apart from statute or ordi-
nance.' 7 Any dog not penned or chained will foreseeably, if not certainly,
intrude upon property of others; the broad definition of "intent" is thus
met, since the owner will assuredly know this. Nevertheless, legal sym-
metry gives way here to practical solutions, and it is deemed more
important to permit dogs to roam than to protect the landowner's grass,
at least apart from statute or ordinance. Thus, in the case of household
pets even a substantially certain trespass by the pet does not impose
liability, but in the case of a pack of hounds, often deliberately run,
and with the substantial certainty that they will not only intrude but
cause substantial damage, there is liability.18
There are cases in which the intent seems even more attenuated and
remote. If defendant owns Blackacre and sells it to T, but points out
the boundaries erroneously and thus leads the purchaser to trespass on
the plaintiff's adjacent land, defendant is held for the trespass. In Mc-
Bryde v. Coggins-Mclntosh Lumber Co.,'" the plaintiff sued the lumber
company as a trespasser. The lumber company was on the land under
a deed from its vendor, and brought its vendor in as a third party
defendant for contribution or indemnity. This was held proper, since
the plaintiff could have sued the vendor of the land directly for the
vendee's trespass, at least where the vendor pointed out plaintiff's land
as a part of that conveyed. Perhaps the same is true where the defen-
dant merely sells land he does not own without actually pointing out
the plaintiff's land as a part of that sold.2" In a sense the requisite intent
" Note, .33 N.C.L. REv. 134 (1954). See, e.g., Olson v. Pederson, 206 Minn.
415, 288 N.W. 856 (1939). In this case, a dog trespassed on the plaintiff's land
and jumped on the plaintiff, knocking her down; no cause of action was stated
under the common law rule; many cases are reviewed. A statute has now
changed the common law rule as to dog owners and imposes upon them the
liability of an insurer. MirNN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (1957). The wisdom of
the common law rule itself was questioned in Anderson v. Anderson, 259 Minn.
412, 107 N.W.2d 647 (1961).
"See Pegg v. Gray, 240 N.C. 548, 82 S.E.2d 757 (1954).
1 246 N.C. 415, 98 S.E.2d 663 (1957). An analogous situation arises where a
judgment creditor induces the sheriff to levy upon property which turns out not to
be property of the judgment debtor at all. In this case, the judgment creditor is
not liable merely because he is a judgment creditor, but only if he in some manner
induces the levy or execution. See Mica Indus., Inc. v. Penland, 249 N.C. 120,
107 S.E.2d 120 (1959) (trespass to chattels).
" In several cases liability has been imposed upon a grantor of timber lands
without any indication that he pointed out erroneous boundaries or otherwise
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can be found for holding the defendant liable in such cases, since one
is held to intend the natural consequences of his acts,21 and certainly
the natural consequence of a conveyance is that the purchaser will enter
the land so conveyed. Nevertheless, cases of this sort are troublesome,
because as a matter of policy a vendor of land probably ought to be
free to convey it and to shift at least some responsibilities to a willing
purchaser. Probably he is not allowed to do so in certain cases for a
combination of reasons, not the least of which is that if the plaintiff
had sued the purchaser-trespasser, the purchaser might be able to obtain
indemnity from the seller,2 2 and that being so, the plaintiff might as
well be permitted to go against the seller directly. Another reason is
probably associated with unjust enrichment, and where there is no eco-
nomic gain and loss involved, there may be more reluctance to allow a
recovery against the grantor. 3 The exact limits of these cases are not
known, but it is apparent that they raise difficult problems, some of
which are discussed elsewhere.2"
There are cases in which liability is imposed where neither intent
in the broad sense nor negligence is present. These include not only
cases involving blasting 5 or other extra-hazardous activity,26 but also
cases in which the particular property right in question is deemed abso-
lute and protected even against unintended, non-negligent invasions.
Landowners, at least in some states, 27 have absolute rights to lateral sup-
port of their land.2" Sometimes there are absolute rights and duties in
misled the purchaser into a trespass except by conveying land or timber he did
not own. Owen v. Branning Mfg. Co., 168 N.C. 397, 84 S.E. 389 (1915);
Locklear v. Paul, 163 N.C. 338, 79 S.E. 617 (1913). Some courts apparently
would not impose liability--except perhaps for unjust enrichment-on such facts.
See McDermott v. Sway, 78 N.D. 521, 50 N.W.2d 235 (1951).
" See Anderson v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ; materials
cited note 14 supra.
"See McBryde v. Coggins-Mclntosh Lumber Co., 246 N.C. 415, 98 S.E.2d
663 (1957).
See discussion note 31 infra.
" See Part II.
See note 3 supra.
' Poison spray is an example. See Loe v. Lenhardt, 227 Ore. 242, 362 P.2d
312 (1961). See also Wall v. Trogdon, 249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959)
(a poison spray case decided on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove
cause in fact, and apparently the issue of strict liability was not argued).
See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1309, 1331 (1953) (duty of mine operators).
8There is apparently an absolute duty to avoid removal of support for adjoin-
ing land in its natural state, but only a duty of ordinary care to avoid injury
by removal of support when the adjoining land is burdened by artificial structures.
Davis v. Summerfield, 131 N.C. 352, 42 S.E. 818 (1902). But liability is "strict"
in any case to the extent that the employer may be liable for even the negligence
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connection with drainage of waters as well." And, though courts have
disagreed, there are decisions imposing liability for underground seepage
of liquids that pollute waters on plaintiff's land, usually on a theory
of nuisance rather than trespass."0 In addition to these cases in which
intent may not always be required, there are cases in which defendant
not only damages the plaintiff's land, but profits in so doing, as where
he cuts timber and sells it, or where he collects rent from a person
living on the land.3 In such cases the liability should exist, not because
defendant has trespassed but because he has profited from plaintiff's
property. Accordingly, whenever such an unjust enrichment case can
be made out, intent should not be required. Although the courts have
not articulated this reasoning, the cases for the most part seem to be con-
sistent with it, and it is probably accurate to say that intent is not re-
quired in these unjust enrichment situations.8 2
INTERESTS PROTECTED: POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP
In General
The law of trespass protects two quite distinct interests in land.
One is ownership, the other is possession; however, before the nine-
teenth century procedural reforms, ownership interests were often pro-
tected by actions of trespass on the case and hence required proof of
actual damages.3 3 These interests may be united in one person, of course,
but sometimes they are not, for one may possess land under the owner's
authority, or one may possess it adversely to the owner, and in either
of an independent contractor who removes adjacent support. Davis v. Summer-
field, 133 N.C. 325, 45 S.E. 654 (1903).
2 See note 3 supra.
"0 See Masten v. Texas Co., 194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927); Cities Serv.
Oil Co. v. Merritt, 332 P.2d 677 (Okla. 1958); Iverson v. Vint, 243 Iowa 949,
54 N.W.2d 494 (1952). In the latter case molasses was, according to custom,
dumped in a drainage ditch; it percolated and contaminated plaintiff's well.
Recovery was allowed without proof of fault. Contra, Phillips v. Sun Oil Co.,
307 N.Y. 328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954).
" See, e.g., London v. Bear, 84 N.C. 266 (1881). One wrongly claiming
land leased it to tenants. He then assigned the lease to the defendant, who
collected the rents. The true owner then sued defendant and recovered. It may
be said that the defendant is liable because he is "in possession" through the
tenants. But this certainly seems a strange explanation, for surely he would
not be liable if the tenants had not paid him rent. This is explicable only on the
unjust enrichment grounds. See Part II.
8" See the fuller discussion in Part II. It must be added, however, that
standard doctrine does not establish this view.
"
0See Cherry v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.
138 (1906).
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case may have an action against a trespasser. But even when the interests
in possession and ownership are joined in one person, it is important for
practical reasons to distinguish them, because rules of pleading and
proof, 4 of parties, 5 of damages,3 6 and even perhaps of substance 7 are
much affected according to which legal interests are involved.
The purpose in protecting ownership or economic interests is easy
to understand. If the defendant cuts the owner's timber or otherwise
injures the value of the land it is not only clear that the owner may
recover-even if he was not in possession-but it is also readily under-
standable."
The purpose in protecting possession is more complex. Where pos-
session is under a lease, or similar authority, the possessor is in fact an
owner of a limited estate, and the protections extended to full ownership
naturally extend pro tanto to the limited ownership.3 9 However, a pos-
sessor of land who has no right to be there at all and who is in fact
possessing adversely to the true owner, is also protected against tres-
passers, 40 though, of course, not against the entry of the true owner or
his licensees.41 Not every person on the land, of course, is a "possessor."
A casual trespasser is not, nor a licensee or tenant at will4  who is
not exercising dominion over the land" or who is on it only sporadically.45
But if one is in possession by reason of his dominion over the land, he
" See notes 73-80 infra and accompanying text.
" See notes 61-72 infra and accompanying text.
Id.
'r See notes 52-57 infra and accompanying text.
"Where the owner is not the possessor, he must show actual pecuniary loss.
This is often symbolized by saying that his claim is not one for trespass at all,
but for trespass on the case.
" See Willis v. Branch, 94 N.C. 142 (1886). (landlord's trespass upon tenant);
Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192 (1950).
," See notes 85-86 infra.
'" Roberts v. Preston, 106 N.C. 411, 10 S.E. 983 (1890); Everett v. Smith,
44 N.C. 303 (1853). The owner may likewise enter against one who is on the
land with his permission, but who, as a mere licensee, has no right to exclude
the owner. As to such a person, the owner's entry, or that of his agents, is
no trespass at all. Walton v. File, 1 N.C. 567 (1836) (tenant at will).
"' Patterson v. Bodenhammer, 33 N.C. 4 (1850).
"'Cf. Walton v. Hulse, 18 N.C. 567 (1836) (tenant at will, as against a
true owner.) Such a tenant, however, or a licensee, might well exercise sufficient
dominion over the land to establish possession that would allow him standing
to sue a mere trespasser. See Cohoon v. Simmons, 29 N.C. 189 (1847).
" The test is whether the plaintiff is exercising "dominion" over the land,
and this is contrasted with casual entry upon it. See Morris v. Hayes, 47 N.C.
93 (1854) ; notes 40 & 43 supra.
"' See the instruction in Hulse v. Brantley, 110 N.C. 134, 14 S.E. 510 (1892).
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may maintain trespass against all but the true owner, 40 even though he
himself has no title.47 One reason given for *this rule is that it is
convenient as a matter of judicial administration: "[F] or wretched would
be the policy which required the title to be shewn in every instance where
the peaceable possession was disturbed.... It would tend to broils and
quarrels, and the possessor would resort to force. ... 48 Possession
most often does in fact represent good grounds for being on the land,
and it is convenient to avoid long proof about title when this is so.
Beyond this, it is said that such a rule protects against "broils and
quarrels," because the possessor will tend to protect himself against all
but the true owner, at least, by force. And even the "evil" possessor
who knows he has moved onto another's land ought to be protected
against marauders, who otherwise might be free to plague the possessor
and his family without limit.
The traditional emphasis on protecting the possessor from violence
has perhaps obscured other more subtle interests involved in possession.
The possessory interest today is largely a dignitary one. Possession is
less a physical sanctuary from marauders than an emotional and digni-
tary one. The right of exclusive possession is a right to the control,
self-reliance, and self-confidence such possession can give, and the pro-
tection of possession in trespass cases is closely allied with the protection
of privacy.4 9 The dignitary interest involved is further emphasized by
the number of trespass cases in which plaintiffs recover for mental
distress.5" As all this serves to underscore, pecuniary harm is thus not
See notes 48, 85 & 86 infra.
'7 Id.
Myrick v. Bishop, 8 N.C. 485, 486 (1821). See also Frisbee v. Town of
Marshall, 122 N.C. 760, 30 S.E. 21 (1898); Cohoon v. Simmons, 29 N.C. 189
(1847); Horton v. Hensley, 23 N.C. 163 (1840) (fact that a third person
had title so that the plaintiff was a mere possessor was no defense). On similar
principles, it is no defense that plaintiff holds title as a trustee or holds title in
his own right. Walker v. Fawcett, 29 N.C. 44 (1846).
," This is well illustrated by the "Operation Bedcheck" affair, in which wel-
fare workers, on a random basis and without search warrants or other authority,
made midnight "raids" on homes of certain female welfare recipients to deter-
mine whether they had men in the house. Disapproving this tactic, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court spoke of it as an invasion of privacy, but clearly a case of
common law trespass could equally be made out. See Parrish v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Reptr. 623 (1967).
" E.g., Brame v. Clark, 148 N.C. 364, 62 S.E. 418 (1908), where plaintiff
recovered for a trespass to his land and the attempted seduction of his wife
that accompanied the trespass. Other cases involving mental anguish or dignitary
interests in trespass actions are discussed in notes 98-101 infra.
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required when the action is one to vindicate possessory rather than
ownership rights."
Ownership and Possessiot-Interests Excluded
Since actions on a trespass theory protect only ownership or posses-
sion of land, any interest that does not fall in one of these two categories
is not protected, except as it may be incidental to a protected interest.
Thus if defendant trespasses upon Blackacre, the neighbors to Blackacre
cannot complain of the trespass, 2 though depending upon the kind of
trespass involved they may have some other kind of claim, such as one
based upon nuisance.53 The same idea excludes recovery for overflights
of airplanes at 10,000 feet, 54 since the airspace in such an area is not
reduced to possession, and is not now considered subject to ownership,
though an intrusion in lower airspace that is in fact possessed or "owned"
may be actionable." It is usually thought that ownership or possession
extends downward into the ground indefinitely and that underground
trespasses are actionable.5 6 There may be limits, however; as technology
makes possible incursions into the earth at great depths, underground
activities may come to seem more and more like airplane flights high
above the ground, and where the underground incursion does not cause
pecuniary loss nor affect the landowner's use, it may be that liability is
inappropriate.
Intrusions that do not affect possession or ownership, but only use
or enjoyment of land, are considered non-trespassory, and either they
" Schafer v. Southern Ry., 266 N.C. 285, 145 S.E.2d 887 (1966), modified in
other respects, 267 N.C. 419, 148 S.E.2d 292 (1966); Hutton & Bourbonnais v.
Cook, 173 N.C. 496, 92 S.E. 355 (1917).
" Cf. Waller v. Dudley, 194 N.C. 139, 138 S.E. 595 (1927) (unnecessary
or improper to join neighbors, though neighbors have a preference as between
plaintiff and defendant in trespass action).
" In general, a nuisance is an unreasonable interference with one's use and
enjoyment of his land, and it is usually nontrespassory. See, e.g., Watts v. Pama
Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611, 124 S.E.2d 809 (1962).
" Apparently everyone agrees that at such altitudes there is no trespass, in
spite of the statement frequently made before the use of airplanes, that the land-
lord owned the airspace above the land. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 159, comment g (1965). This is the implication of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-13(1965).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-13 (1965).
30A leading case is Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028
(1936), where defendant owned land on which there was an entrance to a cave.
Tourists were admitted and followed the cave which meandered under the sur-
face of the plaintiff's land. Plaintiff recovered. Defendants have also been held,
though often on a nuisance theory, for underground percolation of pollutants
shifting to plaintiff's lands and contaminating his wells. See note 3 supra.
1968]
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are not actionable at all, or are actionable only on theories such as
nuisance" or eminent domain "takings. ' '1"
On similar principles, an entry upon an easement is often no trespass
against the easement holder, since the owner of the easement has no
exclusive right to possession.59 Only if there is interference with the
effective use of the easement-a protected interest-can the easement
owner have a remedy, for only then has he been wronged.10 Indeed,
such interference is usually not considered trespassory at all, since the
easement owner, by definition, has no right to exclusive possession, but
only a right to be free from actual interference with his use of the
easement.
Ownership and Possession-Effects on Parties and Damages
The interest invaded determines both the proper party plaintiff and
the kind of damages allowable; to a very large extent the question
of parties and the question of damages are interrelated. An actual pos-
sessor of land is always a proper party plaintiff, for by definition, a
trespass invades his possession and he will recover at least nominal
damages."' Of course, the possessor holding adversely to the true owner
has no claim against the owner or his licensees, 2 for they are not tres-
passers at all. But if the possessor is there by authority of the owner,
or if the trespasser is not, the possessor will always have his action. 3
Thus even one who possesses adversely to the true owner has an action
against a trespasser."
See note 53 supra.
See, e.g., Caveness v. Charlotte, R. & S.R.R., 172 N.C. 305, 90 S.E. 244(1916).
Cf. Ferrell v. Durham Tract. Co., 172 N.C. 682, 90 S.E. 893 (1916).
As where an easement gives plaintiff the right to use a road and defendant
obstructs it or damages it. Strickland v. Shew, 261 N.C. 82, 85, 134 S.E.2d 137,
139 (1964) : "One, who by his deed has specifically granted to another an ease-
ment of access, may not obstruct the easement in such manner as to prevent or
to interfere with its reasonable enjoyment by his grantee." See Scaife v. Cole-
man 239 Ark. 427, 389 S.W.2d 884 (1965); Ennis v. Gran, 16 N.J. Super.
184, 84 A.2d 35 (1951).
"
1 See Lee v. Lee, 180 N.C. 86, 104 S.E. 76 (1920); Salisbury v. Western
N.C.R.R., 98 N.C. 465, 4 S.E. 465 (1887).
"Roberts v. Preston, 106 N.C. 411, 10 S.E. 983 (1890); Everett v. Smith,
44 N.C. 303 (1853).
"Frisbee v. Town of Marshall, 122 N.C. 760, 30 S.E. 21 (1898); Cohoon
v. Simmons, 29 N.C. 189 (1847); Horton v. Hensley, 23 N.C. 163 (1840) (fact
that a third person had title so that the plaintiff was a mere possessor was no
defense); Myrick v. Bishop, 8 N.C. 485 (1821).
" Hayes v. Williamson-Brown Lumber Co., 180 N.C. 252, 104 S.E. 527
(1920); Simmons v. Defiance Box Co., 153 N.C. 257, 69 S.E. 146 (1910).
[Vol. 47
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The true owner, however, may or may not have an action against
the trespasser. If he is also a possessor he has the action on that basis.
If he is not a possessor, however, as where he has leased the premises
to a tenant, his interest in the land is an ownership interest only and
not a possessory interest. Consequently, in such a case he recovers against
the trespasser only if the trespasser has in fact invaded an ownership
interest. If the trespasser causes no pecuniary harm at all, he clearly
invades only the possessor's interest. Likewise, if the trespasser damages
the tenant's goods or frightens the tenant's family, or removes a rose
from a rosebush in the garden, no ownership rights have been invaded
at all. If the trespasser removes the rosebush altogether, or cuts timber,
or quarries rock, he damages the "inheritance" or freehold--ownership
rights that will affect the value of the property not only now, but as
of the time the owner will come back into possession. These distinctions
have been recognized clearly by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Thus one who claims for physical damages to the freehold must show
title in himself and not merely possession. 5 And though a tenant will
have an action for disturbance of his possession,"0 if there is permanent
damage to the freehold, the landlord, as owner, will recover damages for
that. 7
As all this would indicate, a remainderman or reversioner will be a
proper party plaintiff, since he has an ownership interest, but of course
his claim will fall under the same limits as that of any other owner; and
he must show, if he is not a possessor, permanent damage to the free-
hold as a basis for recovery."" For practical reasons, contingent re-
Even a wrongful possessor who is in fact in possession is allowed recovery
against the true owner where the true owner attempts a forcible re-entry, since
the owner should avoid a breach of the peace and resort to the courts for
redress. Cf. Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934) (owner sued
for forcible trespass, but recovery denied because owner did not use force, only
aggressive language).
" Daniels v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 418, 74 S.E. 331 (1912);
Salisbury v. Western N.C.R.R., 98 N.C. 465, 4 S.E. 465 (1887).
"
0 Tripp v. Little, 186 N.C. 215, 119 S.E. 225 (1923); Lee v. Lee, 180 N.C.
86, 104 S.E. 76 (1920). See also cases cited note 63 supra.
"Tripp v. Little, 186 N.C. 214, 119 S.E. 225 (1923) (Hoke, J.); Cherry v.
Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C. 422, 53 S.E. 138 (1906). See
Lamb v. Swain, 48 N.C. 370 (1856). A number of cases state that in trespass
for timber cutting, plaintiff must allege and prove that he is the owner. These
are evidently decided upon the principle stated in the text and presumably do
not mean that a possessor could not recover with appropriately limited damages.
See Norman v. Williams, 241 N.C. 732, 86 S.E.2d 593 (1955); Johnson v.
Eversole Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 249, 60 S.E. 1129 (1908).
"S Cherry v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C. 422, 53 S.E.
138 (1906). The Court considered the action to be one of "trespass on the
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maindermen are not permitted to sue for a trespass since this would
involve impossible calculations.
It is sometimes said that one cotenant may not sue another cotenant
for trespass. This is not entirely accurate. Cotenants have joint rights
of possession of the land, and consequently the entry of one is not a
trespass at all, for it must be considered authorized. Put another way,
the complaining cotenant has no ground for complaint, for he never had
any legally protected interest in exclusive possession and a cotenant's
entry is not an invasion upon exclusive possession at all. If a cotenant
tears the roof off a house held in tenancy with another, however, there
is an invasion of the ownership interest, and the innocent cotenant may
recover for such an invasion.70 Very likely the action will be called
one for "waste,"1 1 but whatever it is called, it simply means that a
cotenant's ownership interest is protected against trespass by his cotenant.
Probably a somewhat similar analysis may be made of problems that
sometimes arise when there is a sale of land not fully paid for and a
trespass then occurs, though the problems in these cases are more com-
plex.72
Ownership and Possession-Effects on Pleading and Proof and Res
Judicata
If the plaintiff claims permanent damages to the freehold, as in
timber cutting claims, he is necessarily asserting an ownership interest.
In this kind of case he must prove his title; probably he should also
plead it. At any rate, when plaintiff's title is denied by defendant, the
burden is upon plaintiff to prove his title, and he will lose if he does
case" rather than pure "trespass," but with the passing of the forms of action,
this means only that plaintiff must show actual pecuniary damages, which in
this situation is clear in any event.
"Latham v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 139 N.C. 9, 51 S.E. 780, (1905).
"
0Jones v. McBee, 222 N.C. 152, 22 S.E.2d 226 (1942); Anders v. Meredith,
20 N.C. 199 (1839).
71 Cases cited note 70 mpra.
7 Earlier cases held or stated that the equitable owner could not recover for
a trespass took place before he took possession, but the legal owner held as
"trustee for the purchaser." Henley v. Wilson, 77 N.C. 216 (1877); Jones v.
Taylor, 12 N.C. 434 (1828); McMilan v. Hafley, 4 N.C. 186 (1815). Later
cases have allowed an equitable owner to recover. Skinner v. Terry, 134 N.C.
305, 46 S.E. 517 (1904); Taylor v. Eatman, 92 N.C. 601 (1885) (ejectment on
equitable title; deed to wife was void at law but good in equity). On the other
hand, if a claim for trespass has accrued before the sale takes place, a deed
from the owner to a new purchaser does not transfer any right of action the
owner might have. Daniels v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 158 N.C. 418, 74
S.E. 331 (1912).
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not succeed in doing so. Quite a large number of cases involve situa-
tions of this sort, 3 in which title is very much an issue, for the plaintiff
must rely upon it and not upon the weakness of the defendant's claim.74
At the same time it must be remembered that title is not an issue at all
in a trespass case where the plaintiff sues only to vindicate his possessory
rights.75 This is why in some cases the Court emphasizes title while in
others it emphasizes possession. The "essence of trespass" is disturbance
of possession-where possession rights are being vindicated. Where
ownership rights are asserted, the "essence of trespass" is injury to
ownership. Thus title must be pleaded or at least proved where damages
are sought for injury to the freehold-permanent injury to the land.
The same distinction obviously also affects the description of the
land required in pleadings and judgments. Where the plaintiff's claim
is based solely upon possession, the land probably need not be described in
any legal sense."8 It is enough to give some general indication of its
location, as by indicating the county or town where the land lies.77
The legal description of its boundaries in such a case is probably of no
interest, but if it is, a motion to make more definite can be made by
the defendant.7 Where the plaintiff's claim is one involving ownership
interests, or where the defendant justifies his entry by asserting title
superior to plaintiff's, title is obviously involved just as it is in the
daughter action of ejectment. Since title is involved and ought to be
cleared up if possible, a good description of the land in the pleadings
and proof, if not a necessity, is at least good practice.79 Even in such a
"Scott v. Lewis, 246 N.C. 298, 98 S.E.2d 294 (1957); Williams v. Robert-
son, 235 N.C. 478, 70 S.E.2d 692 (1952); Locklear v. Oxendine, 233 N.C. 710,
65 S.E.2d 673 (1951); W.M. Ritter Lumber Co. v. Montvale Lumber Co., 169
N.C. 80, 85 S.E. 438 (1915).
" Bowers v. Mitchell, 258 N.C. 80, 128 S.E.2d 6 (1962); Tripp v. Keais, 255
N.C. 404, 121 S.E.2d 596 (1961); Shingleton v. North Carolina Wildlife Res.
Comm'n, 248 N.C. 89, 102 S.E.2d 402 (1958); Hayes v. Ricard, 244 N.C. 313,
93 S.E.2d 540 (1956); Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C. 93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955);
Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759 (1953); Meeker v. Wheeler, 236
N.C. 172, 72 S.E.2d 214 (1952); Smith v. Benson, 227 N.C. 56, 40 S.E.2d 451(1946).
" Where the trespass is "'against his possession' the plaintiff is not required
to prove title, but only lawful possession and damages for interfering therewith."
Short v. Nance-Trotter Realty, Inc., 262 N.C. 576, 578, 138 S.E.2d 210, 211(1964). "Lawful" possession is in fact any possession. See note 48 supra.
"Whitaker v. Forbes, 68 N.C. 228 (1873). See Womack v. Carter, 160 N.C.
286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912).
"Whitaker v. Forbes, 68 N.C. 228 (1873) ("a certain lot in Enfield" held
sufficient).
"Wonack v. Carter, 160 N.C. 286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912).
"Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C. 93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955). In Coastal Land
19681
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case, however, the absence of a good description in the pleadings does
not seem critical if the judgment which ultimately goes on record con-
tains an adequate description. The judgment is of course insignificant
where only possession is involved, but is quite important as a title docu-
ment when title is in issue.
Since title is not in issue in a trespass action involving only posses-
sion, a judgment for the plaintiff in such a case is not res judicata or
estoppel by judgment as to plaintiff's title.80 The favorable judgment
might have been based solely upon plaintiff's right to possession and
not upon his title at all. And unless there was permanent damage to
the freehold, the plaintiff could not have even put title into issue. Thus
considerable care should be taken to frame the pleadings and issues to
indicate clearly whether title is or is not involved so as to obtain or
avoid the res judicata effect as desired.
Actual and Constructive Possession
There is a good deal of old lore concerning possession. Most of it
has gradually disappeared since the forms of action were abolished,8"
but even some modern cases may occasionally speak in the fictions of
an earlier day and some mention should be made of these.
The main fiction employed is that trespass rules always protect pos-
session. As the trespass action clearly protected ownership as well, the
courts redefined possession so as to include ownership. Thus it was said
that if one had title and the land was not in the actual possession of
anyone else, then he had "constructive possession."82 The courts in
fact ignored any supposed requirement that the land be "vacant" and
found constructive possession in any title holder.8 3 Thus where owner-
& Timber Co. v. Eubank, 196 N.C. 724, 146 S.E. 857 (1929), the Court held
insufficient a description of the land as a "certain tract" in Onslow County cast
of a railroad track and containing 5,000 acres.8 See Fincannon v. Sudderth, 144 N.C. 587, 57 S.E. 337 (1907).
1In Bynum v. Carter, 26 N.C. 310, 316 (1844), Ruffin, C.J., said: "It is
not doubted that the entry of the owner upon a trespasser will enable the former
to maintain trespass .... [But it] must be an entry for the purpose of taking
possession. . . ." In White v. Cooper, 53 N.C. 48 (1860), the owner out of
possession went on the land with witnesses, read defendant possessor a statement
in which the plaintiff-owner claimed title, and stalked off; this was an entry
sufficient to enable the owner to maintain trespass. Presumably all this would
be unnecessary today.
"
2 See Waters v. Dennis Simmons Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 232, 70 S.E. 284
(1911); Smith v. Ingram, 29 N.C. 175 (1847); Gilchrist v. McLaughlin, 29 N.C.
310 (1847); Dobbs v. Gullidge, 20 N.C. 197 (1838).
" Thus a comparatively modern statement of the constructive possession fic-
tion:
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ship rights were asserted, they were protected under the label of con-
structive possession. The constructive possession definition treated the
owner as the "possessor" when no one else was in possession of the
land. When the owner put a tenant on the land, however, the tenant was
the possessor, and the owner was not. In such a case the owner recovered
only if he could prove actual damage-that is, pecuniary loss. This rule,
which made very good sense indeed, was explained on the now outmoded
ground that the owner's action was one of trespass on the case and not
one of trespass at all,"' and that in the action trespass on the case,
pecuniary loss is always essential to recovery. The simple explanation
seems to be the one given here-namely that the two interests of owner-
ship and of possession were each protected to their full extent, and that
actual pecuniary loss was required in certain situations because in those
situations there was no other legal interest worthy of protection. The
use of the fiction that only possession rights were being protected prob-
ably has obscured a good deal of the common sense that in fact exists
in trespass law. Relatively little difficulty is encountered when "actual
possession" rather than constructive possession is involved. Actual pos-
session involves physical presence upon the land or upon some portion
of it, and although this presence need not be continuous, it must in-
volve more than an occasional or casual entry."5 The presence need not
be "lawful," at least not in the sense that it is accompanied by title or
The action of trespass quare claismn fregit is the appropriate remedy for
the wrongful invasion of another's possession of realty. It lies for injury
to the possession, and . . . it is required that the plaintiff should establish
by proper proof that he was in the actual or constructive possession of the
property at the time the wrong was done... If there is no evidence of
actual possession, and the plaintiff seeks to recover by reason of constructive
possession, it becomes necessary for him to show title and to show that such
title existed in him at the time of the alleged trespass.
Gordner v. Blades Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 110, 111, 56 S.E. 695, 696 (1907). See
also Elliot v. Roanoke R.R. & Lumber Co., 169 N.C. 394, 86 S.E. 506 (1915)
(plaintiff has burden of proving title when he relies on constructive rather than
actual possession); Drake v. Howell, 133 N.C. 162, 45 S.E. 539 (1903) ; McLean
v. Murchison, 53 N.C. 38 (1860); Smith v. Wilson, 18 N.C. 40 (1834); Phelps
v. Blount, 13 N.C. 177 (1829) (title by estoppel is constructive possession). See
note 81 supra (indicating the court's concern at one time with the owner's estab-
lishing "possession" by making an entry upon the land).
"See note 68 mpra.
' See the instruction apparently approved in Hulse v. Branley, 110 N.C. 134,
14 S.E. 510 (1892). See also Hayes v. Williamson-Brown Lumber Co., 180
N.C. 252, 104 S.E. 257 (1920); Simmons v. Defiance Box Co., 153 N.C. 257,
69 S.E. 146 (1910); Morris v. Hayes, 47 N.C. 93 (1854); Patterson v. Boden-
hammer, 33 N.C. 4 (1850) (storing boxes in house not "possession"). Cf. Kaylor
v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934).
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permission of the owner; on the contrary, it may be possession com-
pletely adverse to the owner, 6 and such possession will be a basis for
maintaining an action against any one but the owner.87
LIABILITY FOR UNINTENDED AND UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES
It is generally said that a trespasser is liable not only for the damages
he intends to cause or causes negligently, but also for all damages he
does in fact cause. In other words, he is liable for unintended and
unforeseeable consequences of his trespass-"any consequence which
naturally flows.""8 This extensive liability is said to protect not only the
possessor or owner, but also his immediate family or his "household."8
There is support for such statements in North Carolina decisions and
in others, 0 but the exact scope of this unusual liability is far from clear.
In Lee v. Stewart,91 the defendant, though he had been told to stay
" But even the owner would be liable for a forcible entry upon his own land
and against a wrongful possessor, since the policy is to discourage use of force
and to encourage resort to the courts. Cf. Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E.
560 (1934) (no recovery against true owner on facts, since he used only aggres-
sive language).
8 See notes 48 & 85 supra.88Hatchell v. Kimbrough, 49 N.C. 163, 165 (1856). See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) OF ToRTs § 162 (1965).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 162 (1965).
"E.g., St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670(Fla. 1950). There a trespasser (apparently only a technical trespasser) ran
over a child. The court held "unavoidable accident is not a defense to an action
for trespass." Id. at 677. However, the court also found negligence on the part
of the trespasser. In Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162, 47
N.E.2d 211 (1943), a delivery man went into a glassed-in porch to deliver a
package; he was, as it turned out, at the wrong house, and his entry allowed
the plaintiff, a mentally deficient but apparently normal child, to fall out the door.
The Ohio court held that the child could recover if a jury found the delivery
man to be a trespasser whose trespass was a "proximate cause" of the injury,
but that there would be no liability if the jury found him to be a licensee.
In Brabazon v. Joannes Bros., 231 Wis. 426, 286 N.E. 21 (1939), defendant
entered plaintiff's store and sought to sell a fly spray. Plaintiff refused to buy
the spray, but defendant proceeded to demonstrate it anyway. The spray caused
plaintiff to be sick. The Wisconsin court held that the jury should determine
whether defendant had implied permission or whether his implied permission
had terminated. The court apparently felt that there would be liability if defendant
had exceeded any implied permission he had. In such a case, however, there
seems to be more than the minimum "intent" required for ordinary trespass cases.
In Allstate Fire Ins. Co. v. Singler, 14 Ohio St. 2d 27, 236 N.E.2d 79
(1968), the rule was again stated that a trespasser is liable for all "proximate"
results of his trespass, but it seems clear enough that the trespasser was not
being held to any unusual liability; he had set a fire and was held liable when
it spread. In the same case a different trespasser, who did not participate in
the setting of the fire, was not held liable.
- 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E,2d 804 (1940).
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away, went on the plaintiff's land and used his tobacco barn. Thirty
minutes after he left the premises, fire was noticed in the barn, probably
as a result of the defendant's shattering tobacco in the barn near a
furnace. The defendant was held liable on the ground that a trespasser
is liable for "all damages which proximately resulted from his wrongful
act, whether or not produced intentionally or through negligence." 9
This result seems entirely appropriate on the facts since it is quite likely
on the basis of plaintiff's proof that defendant was negligent, and on
the same basis it is certain that the trespass was a conscious one, and
not merely a minimal or mistaken intrusion. The decision hardly seems
to warrant the conclusion that a trespassing defendant is liable for any
unforeseen harm he causes; it does not answer for a case in which defen-
dant is not morally at fault and where he clearly is not negligent. And,
of course, it does not hold that he is liable for a fire he did not cause,
though probably the court is more liberal in permitting a finding that
his acts in fact caused the fire than it has been in cases where no trespass
has been involved.9" In this respect Bear v. Harris"4 is similar. In
that case a trespasser moved plaintiff's ship from a wharf in Wilmington
down the Cape Fear River to a beach. A storm arose, and the ship was
either blown over or struck by another vessel and sunk. There was no
indication in the opinion that the storm was foreseeable; in fact, the
defendant testified that it "was one of the severest ever known in the
river. "" The defendant further argued that the ship would have been
destroyed in the storm even if she had been left at her original berth.
The Court held the plaintiff could recover and did not even discuss the
unforeseeability of the storm and damage. Further, the Court held that
defendant was liable even though the storm might have caused the same
damage without the defendant's trespass.9" There is an earlier case on
distinguishable facts that seems, in spite of factual differences, difficult
to reconcile in principle.97
Id. at 289, 10 S.E.2d at 805.
'
0 The North Carolina Court has sometimes been quite strict in requiring
rather good proof of cause-in-fact, though perhaps not so strict in Lee. See
Maharias v. Weathers Bros. Moving & Storage, 257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548
(1963) (fire). See Note, Torts-Casal Relationship, 46 N.C.L. REv. 1001
(1968).
118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896).
'
0 Id. at 478.
"6 "There is no evidence that it must have happened. The defendant cannot
qualify his wrong in that way and insist on the possibility of a loss if he had not
exceeded his privilege." Id. at 481, 24 S.E. at 364 (emphasis added).
"' White v. Griffin, 49 N.C. 139 (1856). Plairntiff Qwned a vessel chartered
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Other North Carolina cases are, like Lee, inconclusive on the ques-
tion how far the trespasser is liable. A number of cases involve re-
coveries for mental anguish suffered by a member of the possessor's
family or by the possessor himself as a result of trespass. In Braine v.
Clark,9" the defendant trespassed upon plantiff's land and while trespass-
ing attempted to seduce the plaintiff's wife. The plaintiff was allowed
to recover for this as an element of damages incident to the trespass.
A wife was allowed to recover for mental anguish in Saunders v. Gil-
bert,"' where defendants trespassed by firing bullets at the plaintiff's
house, and in May v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 00 another wife was
allowed to recover when the trespasser upon the husband's land sang
bawdy songs that upset the wife. In still another case a woman recovered
for a miscarriage when defendant trespassed in a very hostile manner
and threatened to fight with the woman's brother.1 1 The defendant's
conduct in each of these cases involved more than a trespass to land.
Probably in each case he would be liable for his conduct even if it had
occurred on his own land, either because his conduct constituted an
assault0 2 or an intentional infliction of mental distress. 10 3 Similarly,
cases imposing liability for "trespass" upon a grave are probably most
realistically explained as cases involving intentional infliction of mental
anguish. 0 4 In any event, none of these cases makes a very convincing
argument for the supposed rule holding a trespasser liable for unintended
and unforeseeable consequences, since in all of them harm to persons
on the land was foreseeable and perhaps intended as well.
Aside from these cases there is Bridgers v. Dill,10 5 where the tres-
passer pulled down fences so that animals got in and destroyed the
to one Burgess. As Burgess was about to sail, defendant detained the vessel
in port and so held it one week. At the end of this time, Burgess was permitted
to sail, which he did. He encountered a "violent tempest" that he would not have
encountered but for the wrongful detention, and the ship was wrecked. The
Court held that the plaintiff could recover nominal damages, but could not re-
cover for loss of the vessel. Of course, this case, as well as Bear v. Harris,
118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896), involve trespasses to chattels rather than
to land.
o8148 N.C. 364, 62 S.E. 418 (1908).
156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
100 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).
... Martin v. Spencer, 221 N.C. 28, 18 S.E.2d 703 (1942). See atso Beasley
v. Byrum, 163 N.C. 3, 79 S.E. 270 (1913) (defendant who entered and shot
dog in wife's presence guilty of forcible trespass).
... See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1963).
...See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
'o'See Matthews v. Forrest, 235 N.C. 281, 69 S.E.2d 553 (1952) (removing
flowers from grave of plaintiff's wife; good cause of action stated).
10097 N.C. 222, 1 S.E. 767 (1887).
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landowner's crops, and Welch v. Piercy,0 6 where the trespasser pulled
down fences so that the landowner's animals got out and were lost. The
Court in these cases did not discuss foreseeability. In Bridgers, the
Court said that crop damage "was the direct and proximate damage
resulting from the wrong... , and in Welch it said that every man
was "presumed to intend any consequence which naturally flows from
an unlawful act .... ,,108 On the same basis, a tenant recovered against
her landlord for loss of an eye that resulted because the landlord had
removed the roof of the house causing the tenant to catch a cold "which
fell into her eye.... 2 9
The exact extent of the trespasser's liability for unintended and un-
foreseen harm is certainly not clear from these cases. It seems to be
true that the trespasser, if he is deliberate," 0 is liable for at least some
injuries he neither intended nor foresaw. And it is clear that it is no
defense to say that he could not have anticipated the way the injury
came about or that he could not have anticipated the extent of the
injury."' Whether he is liable for harm he causes while trespassing if
the harm is wholly unrelated to the trespass is, as yet, unclear, though
it may well depend upon whether the trespass was a deliberate wrong-
doing or something less.
In any event, the tendency to allow recoveries for damages that
may be only remotely related to the trespass clearly does not allow re-
covery for damages not caused at all by the trespass." 2 And very prob-
ably the courts will demand clearer proof of damage when the harm
claimed is pecuniary, such as lost profits, rather than tangible, such as
destroyed crops."'
100 29 N.C. 365 (1847).
10797 N.C. at 226, 1 S.E. at 769.
108 29 N.C. at 370.
109 Hatchell v. Kimbrough, 49 N.C. 163, 164 (1856).
110 The trespasser who knows he is trespassing, but who also knows his act
carries no social stigma presents a difficult problem. The man who pulls into
another's driveway to turn his car around is a trespasser, presumably. Should
he be held liable if without fault he runs over the landowner's child, who suddenly
darts in front of him? Cf. Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162,
47 N.E.2d 211 (1943).1 1 See notes 88, 90 & 92 supra.11
. Cf. Sdhafer v. Southern Ry., 266 N.C. 285, 145 S.E.2d 887 (1966):
Defendant railroad dug a ditch between its track and plaintiff's building. This
allegedly caused water to accumulate next to the foundation so that the building
cracked. The Court indicated that defendant would be liable if in fact the trespass
caused the crack. See also notes 96-97 mtpra.1
. See Willis v. Branch, 94 N.C. 142 (1886). This involved a trespass to
plaintiff's theatre, which caused it to close. The Court said it would allow a
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AUTHORIZED INTRUSION
Consent
There is no trespass at all if the defendant has a right to be upon
the land and does not exceed his rights there, since trespass is an un-
authorized intrusion." 4 Thus in many cases the "defense" to a trespass
action is that the defendant has a right to be upon the land because he
owns it or an interest in it.'15 In many other cases the "defense" is
that, though the defendant had no right to be upon the land by reason
of title, he had a right to be there by reason of the consent of the
owner or possessor." 6 Technically this should not be a matter of de-
fense at all; rather it is a part of the plaintiff's case to prove that
defendant was not only upon the land but that his presence there was not
an authorized one. Thus if the defendant raises the title issue, the plain-
tiff must prove his own title or other right to exclusive possession, and
he cannot merely rely upon the weakness of defendant's title." 7 The
same is probably true with the "defense" of consent; plaintiff must prove
that the entry is unauthorized, at least if defendant raises the issue,
which means there must be evidence that the intrusion was not consented
to by someone with authority.118 Ordinarily this is not a problem, since
the nature of the defendant's act is usually good evidence by itself that
there was no consent, and in any event the plaintiff can usually testify
that none was given. There is an important difference, however, be-
tween saying that defendant may prove consent as a defense and saying
that plaintiff must prove a lack of consent or other authority for defen-
dant's entry. The difference is the burden of proof; it would seem that
recovery for such provable economic harm as lost engagements existing at the
time of the trespass, but would not allow a recovery for profits that might have
been made from uncontracted-for engagements.
.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 158, comment c (1965).
115 E.g., notes 73-74 supra.
""E.g., Williford v. Williams, 127 N.C. 60, 37 S.E. 74 (1900) (burden is on
defendant to show consent, but see note 118 infra as to this); Cox v. Dove, 1
N.C. 73 (1796) (letter giving permission).
" See note 74 supra.
.. The issue whether consent is a privilege and a matter for defense or
whether lack of consent is an element of plaintiff's case to be proved by him
does not arise often. In Williford v. Williams, 127 N.C. 60, 37 S.E. 74 (1900),
the Court said that defendant, having admitted the cutting of timber on plaintiff's
land, had the "burden of proof" on the issue of consent. Very probably this
means only that the plaintiff has made a prima facie case and that the jury
would be justified in believing that no consent was given to cut timber unless
the defendant persuaded it otherwise. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 167,
comment c, places the burden of proving consent on the one relying on it.
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that burden is or should be upon the plaintiff to show that the intrusion
complained of was unauthorized. This, of course, would not prevent
defendant from showing consent if he could do so, and in practice that
is often how the consent issue arises.
In any event, whoever has the burden of proof, if it is established
that the plaintiff consented to the intrusion upon the land, there is no
trespass-at least as to the plaintiff. 19 Any evidence of consent, or
"license" as it is sometimes called, is admitted as bearing on the issue,
subject only to the normal rules of evidence. Sometimes the consent is
explicit and perhaps even in writing. 20 Conditional sales contracts and
similar instruments often authorize repossession when payments are over-
due, and usually these also explicitly authorize entry upon land if neces-
sary to effect the repossession.' 2' Even where an entry upon land is
not expressly authorized, there may be a privilege afforded by law that
permits peaceful entry to effect repossession, 2 though of course neither
consent granted by the plaintiff nor a privilege granted by law justifies
a forceful entry upon the land. 23
The effectiveness of consent to avoid liability for trespass is not
derived from any theory that consent conveys an interest in land-em-
phatically it does not convey such an interest. 24  Rather liability is
avoided by consent because the consent shows that the defendant is not
a trespasser at all. Consequently, there is no requirement that the consent
l'A tenant's consent, for example, would not make a trespasser any less the
trespasser as to the landlord, if the trespasser did permanent damage to the
freehold, i.e., if he invades any recognized interest of the landlord. But the tenant's
consent to picnic in the field, if not exceeded, is good protection for the picnicking
intruder, for as to the tenant he has consent, and as to the landlord he is not
a trespasser and never was, since he did not invade any interest of the landlord's.
-" Scarborough v. Calypso Veneer Co., 244 N.C. 1, 92 S.E.2d 435 (1956)
(timber deed); Cox v. Dove, 1 N.C. 72 (1796) (letter from plaintiff giving
permission may be read in evidence).
... E.g., McDowell v. Talcott, Inc., 183 So. 2d 592 (Fla. App. 1966); Rea v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962); Freeman
v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933). The
validity of such provisions is a problem usually allocated to commercial law
rather than the law of trespass.
... As to privileges afforded by law generally see pp. 58-68 infra. The UNIFORM
CO mERCIAL CODE § 9-503 explicitly authorizes taking possession of collateral
"without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace...." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-9-503 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 183, comment g (1965).
"I Freeman v. General Motors Accept Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63
(1933). But see Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934); Anthony
v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934); notes 21-22 supra.
... See pp. 55-58 infra.
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be in writing. It may be oral 25 or indeed it may be merely implied
from all the circumstances. 2 6 Since there is no particular form required
to establish consent and the problem is only whether consent was given
and what its scope was, it is at least conceivable that legal instruments
may evidence consent even when they fail as legal instruments. A con-
sent is not a contract, however, and ordinarily it is revocable at any
time.127
Both the existence of a consent and its scope may be implied rather
than explicit. If the alleged consent is embodied in a document or
results from some interest defendant has in the land, as under a timber
deed, the document may require construction. 1' If the consent is to be
inferred from circumstances, the circumstances will require interpreta-
tion. One common principle involved where consent by implication is
relied upon is that one impliedly consents to whatever is reasonably
necessary to accomplish anything explicitly consented to. Thus, if a land
owner agrees that his car may be repossessed, he impliedly agrees that
defendant may enter the land if necessary to accomplish the reposses-
sion, 29 though of course he does not consent to removal of his own
belongings that may be in the car. 30 Another principle is that until
given notice to the contrary, a defendant may usually assume the land-
owner consents to what is customarily consented to-for example, that
acquaintances, certain salesmen, probably information seekers, may enter
inhabited land. In addition, any behavior of the landowner that reason-
ably conveys a willingness to suffer an entry implies a consent, as where
the landowner motions for an entry, or where he does not forbid the
entry of a man walking toward the land. Even the landowner's conduct
after the entry may have evidentiary value; if he is silent and makes no
objection to the entry, this "acquiescence" will, under some circumstances,
tend to show his consent,"3' though this will always depend on circum-
stances and silence is not always consent.1 2
... See Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934);
Gardner v. Rowland, 24 N.C. 247 (1842).126 See pp. 52-53 infra.11
, See pp. 55-58 infra.
1.. Scarborough v. Calypso Veneer Co., 244 N.C. 1, 92 S.E.2d 436 (1956);
Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 161, 73 S.E. 902 (1912).
..
9 See note 121 sitpra.
... Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962) (de-
fendant privileged to enter land to repossess, but is liable for items locked in
car and belonging to plaintiff).
..1 See Antonio v. General Outdoor Adver. Co., 414 P.2d 289 (Okla. 1966).
...Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 122 N.W.2d 26
(1963) (silence not conclusive so as to permit summary judgment).
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The consent, whether explicit or implicit, may be limited in space or
time, or according to a purpose; or it may be conditioned upon defen-
dant's conduct. It is frequently a problem how far an implied consent
extends in one of these respects. Unless revoked, the implied consent
extends to allow whatever is necessary to achieve the object for which
the consent was given. Where two adjoining landowners agreed to lay
a rail fence along their common boundary, one-half of the bottom rail
on the land of each landowner, and the defendant located a portion of
this on the plaintiff's land but later removed it, consent was a defense.
"Of course in such arrangements exactness is not expected or re-
quired. . . ."' Similarly, where plaintiff consents to timber cutting
by giving a "timber deed," he necessarily expects the cutting to be done
in an ordinary manner and must expect that the trees will fall and that
some will stop up drains or do other damage. Only if the defendant
is negligent in cutting timber or cuts it in a way to cause un-consented-to
damage is he liable in such a case, again on the principle that the plain-
tiff impliedly consented to all the normal incidents of timber cutting."3 4
But though a defendant may act as reasonably necessary to accomplish
whatever was consented to, he may not go beyond that and act for any
other purpose; he has no more consent than is "essential to the enjoy-
ment" of that to which plaintiff consented.' 35 Thus where the defendant
has permission to store goods on plaintiff's land, he may ordinarily
remove the goods, but he must not cause unnecessary or unreasonable
damages to plaintiff's goods or land in doing so, as by allowing swine
... Whitfield v. Bodenhammer, 61 N.C. 362, 364 (1867). As was common at
this date, the Court expressed the idea of consent in terms of defendant's "joint
possession" of the boundary area. The fundamental notion is clearly one of
implied consent, however.
1. Lewis v. Butters Lumber Co., 199 N.C. 718, 155 S.E. 726 (1930). Similar
is Waters v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 115 N.C. 648 20 S.E. 718 (1894),
where the plaintiff by contract authorized defendant to cut timber and to construct
a train road for removal of the timber. Held, error to allow damages for removal
of "so much timber as ... was reasonably necessary . . . to construct a way"
for the trains. In granting the right to build a road, "the plaintiff, by necessary
implication, agreed to surrender his claim to such damage to his land as might
be incident to the skillful construction of what he had empowered Simmons to
build." 115 N.C. at 654, 20 S.E. at 720. In 'Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond
Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 161, 73 S.E. 902 (1912), the defendant sought, unsuc-
cessfully, to invoke the same principle. There the plaintiff had written to the
defendant that, "Should there be any desire on your part to remove the timber
... you will not find us unwilling to give our permission." 158 N.C. at 165, 73
S.E. at 903. The Court held, however, that the language was too indefinite to
furnish any consent at all, and hence the Court did not get to the question of
the scope of the consent.
"' Gardner v. Rowland, 24 N.C. 247 (1842).
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to trample plaintiff's crops.'88 The same is true if plaintiff has bor-
rowed goods of the defendant; defendant no doubt may enter plaintiff's
land to recover the goods, but he may not use the occasion to damage
plaintiff's goods. 87
The consent is not in any event a consent to violence, and defendant
is liable for trespass if he enters with consent but by his violent or
outrageous conduct goes beyond it. In one case this principle was ex-
tended to hold a defendant a trespasser though his only improper con-
duct was a harsh, rude voice.'88 Probably something more is ordinarily
demanded, and no doubt much turns on circumstances, for it is quite
unlikely that the social guest who is rude or unpleasant becomes a tres-
passer by reason of that fact alone. At any rate something more than
rudeness has been required in the other cases, and defendant is held
to have exceeded the consent only when he goes beyond "rudeness of
language."'1 8 9 Of course where the defendant's privilege upon the land
is derived solely from the plaintiff's non-contractual consent, the con-
sent may be revoked or limited at any time, and the rude or unpleasant
visitor becomes a trespasser if he does not leave after he is told to do
SO.
1 4
o
Id.1 3 Whitley v. Jones, 238 N.C. 332, 78 S.E,2d 147 (1953). In Whitley the
plaintiff borrowed defendant's boat trailer and put his boat on it in his own
yard. While plaintiff was in the hospital, defendant's men re-took the trailer,
putting the plaintiff's boat in the water where it was damaged. The Court said
that defendant would be liable for trespass to land on these facts. The rationale
is not clear, but presumably defendant had authority of law or implied consent
to re-take his trailer in a reasonable fashion, on analogy to the repossession
cases (note 121 supra). The explanation of the decision, then, is probably that
defendant's men exceeded the implied consent.
.8 Freeman v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63
(1933). Defendant entered to repossess a car, payments on which were overdue.
The owner was not at home and the wife told the men not to take the car; the
man's manner was "rather harsh" and he raised his voice. This appears to be
the only untoward conduct. But see note 139 infra.
"" Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934).
Defendant entered to discuss a claim plaintiff was making under an insurance
policy. Defendant was abusive and unpleasant but there was no offer of violence.
The Court held that a trespass claim could not be sustained on these facts.
[A]Ithough not a trespasser in the beginning, he becomes a trespasser as
soon as he puts himself in open opposition to the occupant of the premises.
It is not necessary that the occupant actually be put in fear. ... Rudeness
of language, mere words, or even a slight demonstration of force against
which ordinary firmness is a sufficient protection will not constitute the
offense.
Id. at 11, 173 S.E. at 8. Accord, that more than rudeness is required, Kaylor v.
Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934).
140 As to revocation see pp. 55-58 infra.
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The consent may have implied limits as to space as well as to the
kinds of acts done by the defendant. If he is admitted to a swimming
pool, the consent probably does not authorize him to enter the sewers.141
Consent by Contract-Revocable and Irrevocable Licenses
In most cases where a landowner gives consent to another to enter
or use his land, the parties understand that the consent is revocable
and that it may be withdrawn at any time; this intent is given effect
by the law, so that one who remains on the land after the consent is
revoked or has expired becomes a trespasser whom the landowner is
free to eject.1  However, the landowner may make a valid contract
that amounts to a consent for entry upon and use of his land and if
the contract is indeed valid, the consent may not be revocable. The
easiest case is the one in which the landowner not only gives consent
by contract but in fact conveys an interest in the land itself-for in-
stance, by conveying an easement with a document that meets all the
required formalities. 143  On the other hand, the landowner's consent,
though contractual in nature, may not meet the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds ;144 if he contracts to permit the promisee to use his
land for five years for hunting, this may be an interest in the nature
of an easement or profit a prendre, and if the statute is not complied
with, the "consent" may be revocable. 4 5 In such a case the landowner
would be privileged to eject the promisee after revoking the consent.140
Sometimes a consent purchased by the promisee and given contrac-
tually by the landowner does not comply with the forms prescribed by
141 See Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1960).1
'
2 See cases cited note 149 infra.
Ufl "An easement is an interest in land, and is generally created by deed."
Borders v. Yarbrough, 237 N.C. 540, 542, 75 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1953).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965).
" Discussion of this and related points usually is given under the rubric of
"licenses." An excellent article is Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42
COLUm. L. REv. 809 (1942). Hunting rights have been characterized as "profits
a prendre." They are created only "by grant." See Council v. Sanderlin, 183
N.C. 253, 111 S.E. 365 (1922).
...A landowner may forcibly eject a trespasser, using no more force than is
reasonably necessary. RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (1965). Of course,
cases may arise concerning these revocable licenses quite apart from a landowner's
attempt to eject the "trespasser"; the landowner may sue for trespass instead
of attempting an ejection, as in Hawkins v. Alaska Freight Lines, Inc., 410 P.2d
992 (Alas. 1966); or the landowner may sue to enjoin use of his land, as in
Bieber v. Zellner, 421 Pa. 444, 220 A.2d 17 (1966). Revocability of the license is
also relevant in interference with contract cases. See Morgan v. Speight, 242
N.C. 603, 89 S.E.2d 137 (1955).
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the Statute of Frauds, but nevertheless does not seem to violate any
policy behind the statute. A ticket to a theatre is permission to enter
and use land, but it does not convey an interest in land, and it does
not violate any policy of the Statute of Frauds to enforce the land-
owner's consent in such a case. 47 The same is true where the promisee
is given permission to leave goods on the landowner's land, 4" or buys
or repossesses goods already there;49 such permission is not conveyance
of an interest in land and is entirely valid even if it does not comply
with the Statute of Frauds. Indeed in such situations it is held that the
consent given is "irrevocable" and that the promisee may enter and re-
move his goods within a reasonable time even if the landowner attempts
to revoke his consent.50 The landowner's consent in these instances is
usually called a "license coupled with an interest,"'' but this seems only
to mean that there is no Statute of Frauds policy involved and possibly
that in such cases the law would confer a privilege upon the promisee
even if the contract did not do So.152
When the landowner gives consent contractually for use of his land,
the promisee, or "licensee" as he may be called, may enter the land even
after consent is revoked, where his entry is to protect or remove his
property.'3 In some cases, however, the promisee is not allowed this
"self help" remedy; if the consent is revoked, he must remove himself
from the land peaceably, and if he does not do so, he is a trespasser
subject to ejectment by the landowner. At least this is said to be true
in the case of theatre and race track patrons and others who have pur-
17 See Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 COLUm. L. REv. 809
(1942). See also Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913)(ticket did not convey an interest in a race track).
... See Western N.C.R.R. v. Deal, 90 N.C. 110 (1884) (oral license to use
land for depot; railroad could remove depot when license was revoked). See on
this and related situations RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 176-83 (1965).
1' Repossession: Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127
S.E.2d 225 (1962); Freeman v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 205 N.C. 257,
171 S.E. 63 (1933); note 121 supra. Whitley v. Jones, 238 N.C. 332, 78 S.E.2d
147 (1953), discussed in note 137 supra, is distinguishable.
1. Consent clearly had been revoked, if revocation was possible, in Rea v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962). See also
materials cited note 151 infra.1512 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 8.112, 8.114 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
... See pp. 59-60 infra (privilege of entering to recapture chattels). In Bear
v. Harris, 118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896), defendant purchased the cargo
of a wrecked ship and by terms of the sale was given certain time to remove it.
He moved the ship itself, which the court said was a trespass, exceeding the
license conferred by law.
1
. See note 149 supra.
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chased tickets for entertainment,'54 in the absence of civil rights legisla-
tion. The conceptual reason for this, as expressed by Justice Holmes
in Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club,'55 was that since an interest
in land was not involved the race track patron "had no right to enforce
specific performance by self-help."' 5 6 Of course it does not follow from
this that the landowner has a right to violate his contract by self-help
in the form of forcible ejectment. Nevertheless, there may be good
reason to say that, though a theatre patron wrongly turned away should
have a legal action on contract or possibly in tort in some cases, he does
not have the self-help remedy. Probably landowners will not often turn
patrons away, at least in the amusement-place cases, without good rea-
son, except perhaps in civil rights cases. Their economic interest can
usually be relied upon to prevent arbitrary treatment of patrons; to mini-
mize harassment suits, it makes sense for the law to insist that the patron
show something more than that he was turned away 57 -discrimination,
intentional infliction of mental anguish,"'8 or at least arbitrariness, 5 9 for
example-or to limit his recovery to contract damages.1 6 ° These limita-
... See State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 136 S.E.2d 674 (1964) (Negroes, through
white intermediary, purchased theatre tickets in "white" section; criminal trespass
convictions upheld). Apart from legislation, there is no obligation on the part
of the landowner to consent or sell tickets in the first instance, except as to
common carriers and innkeepers and certain monopolies. See notes 161-163 infra.
The fact that the state licenses or regulates the business, such as a race-track,
does not necessarily impose a duty upon the business to accept all comers, at
least absent discrimination. See Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc.,
102 N.H. 547, 163 A.2d 10 (1960). On the same principle, where tickets are
secured surreptitously by persons whom the landowner would not otherwise admit,
there is no contract or consent at all and the landowner is not obliged to admit
such ticket holders any more than he would be obliged to sell them tickets in
the first instance. See State v. Cobb, supra; cf. Griffin v. State, 225 Md. 422,
171 A.2d 717 (1961).
:r227 U.S. 633 (1913).
°'Id. at 636.
" See Conard, The Privilege of Forcibly Ejecting an Amusement Patron.,
90 U. PA. L. REv. 809 (1942).
"I One might be ejected by use of more force than is reasonably necessary
so that a battery action would lie, or he might be ejected in a manner calculated
to humiliate, so that an action for intentional infliction of mental anguish would
lie. The ejection itself, if otherwise rightful, of course would not furnish a
basis for "intentional infliction" action, apart from legislation. See Tynes v.
Gogos, 144 A.2d 412 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958) (Negro husband and white
wife told that "mixed dancing" was forbidden, no action lies; inadequate dis-
cussion of common law). Humiliation is at least an element of recovery at
common law where a passenger is wrongfully ejected from a common carrier.
Edwards v. Southern Ry., 162 N.C. 278, 78 S.E. 219 (1913).
151 See Tamello v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 102 N.H. 547, 163 A.2d
10 (1960); 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.121 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
"I0 In the ticket cases, the ticket or "license" is revocable only in the sense
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tions are not unfair, and they would tend to discourage harassment suits
and to assure the reality of the patron's claim of mistreatment.
There are "landowners" who are obliged to accept all paid customers,
either under civil rights legislation 11 or under common law rules reg-
ulating carriers162 and innkeepers." 3 These are cases in which the law
itself imposes a duty upon the landowner, and for that reason there is
of course no problem of Statute of Frauds, nor is there any argument
that the license of the patron to enter may be revoked, except for
reasonable cause.
In addition, there are cases in which the landowner's consent is an
attempt to convey an interest in land-a permanent right to use a road,
for example-so that the Statute of Frauds policy is apparently involved
and would avoid such a "consent." In some of these cases, however,
there are equitable considerations that, at least in some jurisdictions,
have taken the case out of the statute and validated the consent. These
are, of course, beyond the scope of any discussion of trespass.
PRIVILEGES AFFORDED BY LAW
In General
In a number of situations the law affords a privilege to an actor who
otherwise would be considered a trespasser. In general, these situations
are those in which the actor, though on the land of another, does not
seem at "fault" and his presence on the land is for a socially desirable
purpose, typically to protect his property, or himself, or to execute legal
process.6 4 As in cases involving consent," 5 liability will be imposed if
that the ticket holder-licensee cannot specifically enforce it by self-help; he may
always sue on the contract represented by the ticket and recover the cost of the
ticket and expenses incurred in attending. See State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 136
S.E.2d 674 (1964).
101 "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segre-
gation. . . ." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (a) (1965).
Remedies are limited, however, and do not include a tort action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-6.
... Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948) (passen-
ger "cannot be arbitrarily ejected when he is not guilty of any misconduct.");
Edwards v. Southern Ry., 162 N.C. 278, 78 S.E. 219 (1913).
...N.C. GEN. STAT. § 72-1 (1965): "Every innkeeper shall at all times pro-
vide suitable food, rooms, beds and bedding for strangers and travelers whom
he may accept as guests in his inn or hotel."
"' See Welch v. Piercy, 29 N.C. 365 (1847). In that case the court ordered
defendant to lay out a road; this was beyond the court's power, and defendant,
who had entered plantiff's land in laying out the road, was held liable.
. See pp. 50-58 supra.
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the privilege is abused or exceeded, and the privilege is not one to enter
forcibly but only to enter peaceably. 6 ' The privilege may be a strong
one that protects the defendant even where he has been forced to do
actual damage; or it may be a weak one that protects him only to the
extent that he is not liable for nominal damages. There is no set number
of privileges. A privilege may be found whenever it seems socially
desirable to permit unauthorized entry upon another's land. Though
these occasions are rare, there is no arbitrary limit to the groups of
cases in which the privilege might be found. The cases do, however, tend
to fall into several common categories, which are examined briefly.
Recovery of Chattels
Where defendant owns goods rightfully left upon the plaintiff's land,
he is privileged to remove them within a reasonable time after his license
to be upon the land is revoked, 6 7 except where his license is for a
stated period, in which case he is not privileged to remove the chattels
after the license terminates. 68 The same sort of privilege exists to re-
cover his goods where the landowner takes them on the land, a thing
that often happens in cases involving repossession of automobiles. 9 In
both cases it may be said that the landowner "consents" to defendant's
entry upon the land and that his "consent" is irrevocable, since defen-
dant has a "license coupled with an interest."'"7 This seems to be an
unnecessarily complicated way of looking at the situation, and it is prob-
ably more direct and accurate to say simply that in either case the law
affords the defendant a privilege to retake his property, and the consent
of the landowner, or lack of it, is wholly immaterial. Again, however,
it must be recognized that the privilege is strictly limited to its purpose
and defendant will be liable if he exceeds it by using force or by dealing
with property with which he is not privileged to deal.' 7 '
A similar privilege is afforded if a flood or other natural catastrophe
unexpectedly carries property to the land of another. The true owner
of the goods is privileged to enter the land to recover them, at least to
"See Anthony v. Teachers' Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934) ;
Freeman v. General Motors Accept. Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E. 63 (1933),
discussed in notes 138-139 supra.
"'See Western N.C.R.R. v. Deal, 90 N.C. 110 (1884), discussed in note 148
supra.
"
8 See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) or TORTS § 177, comment b (1965).
... Cases cited note 166 supra.
"'See pp. 55-58 supra; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 176, Scope
Note (1965).
""See Bear v. Harris, 118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896) and note 165 supra.
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the extent that he is not liable for nominal damages for the entry.1"' A
similar result was reached by the Connecticut court where defendant's
cattle strayed onto plaintiff's land, because the plaintiff had failed to
fence the cattle out as required by agreement; in that case the defendant
was privileged to enter for the purpose of re-taking the cattle.'73 The
privilege in these cases is the privilege of the owner of the goods to
protect his own property, and persons who do not claim ownership may
not claim the privilege,' 74 though if the goods are in danger of imminent
destruction, one not the owner may enter to save them. 5
For obvious reasons there are relatively few cases, but it seems likely
that a distinction should be drawn between cases in which the landowner
is in some measure at fault and where he is not. Where the landowner
is at fault, the privilege of the defendant to recover his goods is justi-
fiably a strong one and should protect him against liability even though
he causes damage to the land, if the damage is reasonably necessary to
the recovery of his own goods. One repossessing an automobile, for
example, should not be liable if in trying to remove it from the land-
owner's muddy back yard, the wheels spin and dig ruts in the ground
or it slides into a rosebush. On the other hand, where the landowner
is not even causal in the transaction-he has not brought the goods on
the land, nor has he harbored them purposefully or used them-then
recovering the goods is a cost fairly to be borne by the owner of the
goods. He is protected by the privilege against a claim for nominal
damages; but if the landowner suffers pecuniary harm, it is fair enough
to put this burden upon the owner of the goods where the landowner
is not a cause of their presence on the land.
Removal of Buildings Built Under Mistake of Ownership
When someone builds a building upon land in the good faith belief
that he owns the land or is otherwise rightfully there, problems become
more complicated. The building becomes realty and ownership of it
normally goes with ownership of the land. The landowner should not
be forced to accept a building he does not want; on the other hand, he
should not be allowed to retain and benefit from the building at the
... Polebitzke v. John Week Lumber Co., 173 Wis. 509, 181 N.W. 730 (1921)
(logs drifted onto plaintiff's land; no liability for nominal damages when defen-
dant removed logs).
'*3 Arlowski v. Foglio, 105 Conn. 342, 135 A. 397 (1926).
17" Mitchell v. Oklahoma Cotton Growers' Ass'n, 108 Okla. 200, 235 P. 597
(1925).
. Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376 (1873).
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builder's expense. The solution has been to allow the landowner an
election: he may permit the builder to remove his building and recover
only for any actual damages the builder does to the land, or he may
keep the building and pay its fair value to the builder.' This seems
to mean that the builder has a privilege to remove the building unless
the landowner elects to pay its value. The builder, however, would re-
main liable for any actual damages done to the land, as for example, by
leaving an excavation upon the land after removing the building.
Private Necessity
In a number of situations one is privileged to enter another's land
to protect himself or his property or others from imminent and serious
danger, or apparently serious danger. One may tie up at another's dock
when a sudden and serious storm threatens ;"' or he may seek refuge
from vicious dogs on plaintiff's land ;178 perhaps he may even, under
some circumstances, remain in the landowner's home when he is ill and
when to leave would be a serious threat to his healthy Not only is
"necessity" found where human life or limb is in danger, but it may also
be found where property is endangered, so that one might be privileged
to lay a firehose across another's land to protect burning property else-
where.'8 0
In such situations the privilege is limited. It protects the actor against
a claim for nominal damages, otherwise available,' 8 ' and it deprives the
landowner of his privilege to eject the actor.' 2 But it leaves the actor
"O The Betterments Statute so provides in effect for defensive situations, i.e.,
where the landowner sues the builder, and where the builder has color of title.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1953). Equity recognizes a similar right for offensive
use in a suit by the builder against the landowner, where the builder has been
denied the privilege to remove the building. Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266
N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966); Cf. Navin, Contracts, Survey of N.C. Case
Law, 45 N.C.L. REv. 895, 898 (1967); Sirvey of N.C. Case Law--Eqitable
Remedies, 39 N.C.L. Rnv. 321, 370 (1961); Note, Statute of Frauds-Oral Con-
tracts to Convey or Devise-Part Performance-Damages, 15 N.C.L. REv. 203(1937).
... Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908) is a leading case.
"" See Rossi v. DelDuca, 344 Mass. 66, 181 N.E.2d 591 (1962) (dog-bite
statute did not protect trespasser, but child trying to escape one dog is not a
trespasser and can recover for bite of defendant's dog).
"'x Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
"
0
' Northern Assurance Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 Mich. 569, 260 N.W.
763 (1935) (dictum).
""
1 See note 51 supra.
"' The landowner may normally use reasonable force to eject a trespasser,
where it is clear that he will not leave on request. See Edwards v. Johnson, 269
N.C. 30, 152 S.E.2d 122 (1967) ; State v. Goode, 130 N.C. 651, 41 S.E. 3 (1902);
State v. Yancey, 74 N.C. 244 (1876).
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liable for any actual damage he in fact does to the land in the course
of saving himself or his goods.183
These principles of "private necessity" are generally accepted, though
there is little direct authority concerning them in North Carolina. One
case bears discussion, if only for the purpose of distinguishing it. In
Schloss v. Hallman,"s the defendant was driving a wrecker when another
car suddenly cut in front of him. He avoided a collision by cutting his
wheels, leaping a curb, and running into a billboard belonging to plain-
tiff. The Court refused to allow the plaintiff's claim, finding no negligence
on the part of the defendant in the light of the emergency, and no
trespass, since there was neither negligence nor an intentional entry upon
the land."8 5 This result seems both correct and in accord with the view
that use of another's land to avoid serious injury to one's self requires
payment for actual damage done." 6 Payment was not required in
Schloss, evidently because there was neither a negligent nor intentional
entry upon the land, but what, for practical purposes at least, was an
accidental entry or at most an entry by reflex action. If the driver in
Schloss had had sufficient time to make a rational choice, so that intent
to enter could be found, perhaps he would have been regarded as a
privileged trespasser, but one who, nevertheless, must pay for pecuniary
damage caused.
Public Necessity
An entry upon land may be privileged, not only where the entry is
made to protect one's own property or life, or the property or life of
another, but also where the entry appears necessary to avoid serious harm
to public interests.'8 7 Where individuals properly exercise this privilege,
they are not liable even for pecuniary harm done to the land or build-
ings ;188 indeed, the whole purpose of the privilege is to encourage de-
struction that appears reasonably necessary for the protection of
the public. There seems no reason not to impose liability upon the
public through the appropriate governmental unit, but this is difficult
188 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)
(a leading case).18'255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961).
. Although there must be either a negligent or an intentional injury, a mis-
take about ownership does not make the entry any less intentional. See note
12 supra.
... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965); see note 183 supra.
18 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 196 (1965).
188 See cases cited notes 193-194 infra.
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because of governmental immunity,'89 and special legislation may be
necessary.
Public necessity situations are not common in this country. During
the war between the states, military emergencies arose that justified the
taking of personal property'9° or did not,19l according to how serious
the emergency was; in Tennessee, for example, the arrival of Union
armies in the vicinity justified destruction of the plaintiff's whiskey to
protect the public. 192 In more recent times similar results have been
reached where property is destroyed to prevent the spread of serious
contagious disease 93 or the spread of fire or flood.' 94
Where the destruction of property is carried out by a city or other
governmental agency, it seems reasonable to hold the governmental
agency liable for such damages as are actually caused, since the public
has benefited and there is no reason why the individual landowner should
be forced to bear the cost of the public benefit. However, state and
local governments are immune to tort suits, except so far as immu-
nity is waived, and it is not waived as to trespasses in North Carolina.' 5
At the same time, recovery is always allowed, as it must be,' 96 for a
"taking" of private property. Thus, though no tort action for "trespass"
lies against a municipality that burns plaintiff's house to avoid a small-
pox epidemic, an action for "taking" plaintiff's property might. This
is far from clear, however. In United States v. Calte%, Inc.,'9" the
plaintiff owned petroleum facilities in Manila at the beginning of the
Japanese attack upon the Philippines. These facilities were destroyed by
... The North Carolina Tort Claims Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1
(1964), eliminates the immunity only for "negligent" acts, and the municipal and
county immunities are unaffected by this act in any event. The Federal Tort
Claims Act, waiving the immunity of the United States, is similarly limited.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1964).
... Koonce v. Davis, 72 N.C. 218 (1875) (emergency justified taking a buggy).
... Bryan v. Walker, 64 N.C. 141 (1870) (military emergency was not suffi-
cient to justify taking mules).
... Harrison v. Wisdom, 54 Tenn. 99 (1872).
... Levin v. Burlington, 129 N.C. 184, 39 S.E. 822 (1901); Prichard v. Mor-
ganton, 126 N.C. 908, 36 S.E. 353 (1900) (county officers burned house, clothes,
and crops to prevent spread of smallpox; city and county not liable because of
governmental immunity).
... The leading case is Surrocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (1853) ; see the mention
of the doctrine in Stocking v. Johnson Flying Serv., 143 Mont. 61, 387 P.2d
312 (1963) (a negligence action, in which fire retardant dropped on public
forest lands contaminated plaintiff's adjoining lands); McCoy v. Sanders, 113
Ga. App. 565, 148 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1966) (dictum).So N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (1964).
... As a matter of due process of law, U.,$, CONST, .arend. V, XIV,17 344 VS, 149 (1952),
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the United States as the Japanese were entering Manila, but the Supreme
Court held that plaintiff could not recover. One ground given was that
the plaintiff's property "was destroyed, not appropriated for subsequent
use.""' This does not seem to be a very good ground. Destruction in
this case is for public benefit and is a form of public "use" in the sense
that seems relevant; that is, in the sense that the public did benefit.
However, the decision may be correct because of the probability that
the plaintiff would have lost the property even if the United States had
not destroyed it. It might also be explained on the ground that if
recovery had been allowed, the Court would then have been forced to
consider liability for battle casualties or to attempt to draw a line be-
tween casualties in actual battle and those in preparation for battle-
probably an undesirable kind of line. Thus it remains possible, even if
a state follows the Caltex case, to say that when war problems are not
involved and the destruction occurs to prevent spread of disease or fire
or the like, the government may be held, if not for trespass, at least
for a "taking" of property so destroyed.'99 Probably this result is desir-
able, not only as a matter of justice, but as a matter of maintaining a
government of limited powers, responsible to individuals for its destruc-
tion of their property; some state statutes compel such payment.00
Regulation, Police Power and Nuisances
Related to "public necessity" situations are several situations involv-
ing not public disaster, but a settled public interest that justifies imping-
.. Id. at 155. See also note 204 infra.
... Permanent trespasses, equivalent to "takings," will be discussed in Part II.
There is a cryptic remark in Prichard v. Morganton, 126 N.C. 908, 36 S.E.
353 (1900), a case in which officers burned plaintiff's house, clothes, and crops
to prevent a smallpox epidemic. The court held that the defendants, city and
county, were not liable because of governmental immunity, but said that some
unspecified remedy "will doubtless suggest itself" to plaintiff's counsel. This
might be read as a broad hint to claim a "taking" rather than a trespass. 126
N.C. at 913, 36 S.E. at 355. See Levin v. Burlington, 129 N.C. 184, 39 S.E.
822 (1901) (similar facts). As to the possibility that government action is a
"regulation" rather than a "use" of property, see note 204 infra.
200 GA. CODE ANN. § 88-401 (1963):
Analogous to the right of eminent domain is the power from necessity,
vested in corporate authorities of cities, towns, and counties, to interfere
with and sometimes to destroy the private property of the citizen for the
public good, such as the destruction of houses to prevent the extension of
a conflagration, or the taking of possession of buildings to prevent the
spreading of contagious diseases. In all such cases, any damages accruing
to the owner from such acts, and which would not otherwise have been
sustained, must be paid by such municipal corporation or county.
The chapter was re-codified and this section was dropped, whether advertently or
not does not appear.
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ing upon the landowner's property interests. Acts necessary, or reason-
ably thought necessary, to discover and punish crime, for example, are
in this category; short of committing illegal acts, anyone privileged to
make an arrest is privileged to enter the landowner's property to do so
if necessary.2"1 Related privileges, such as the privilege to prevent a
crime or to investigate it, carry with them the privilege of entry upon
land where such an entry is reasonably necessary, and where the entry
is in fact carried out reasonably.0 2 As with other privileges, if the actor
acts unreasonably, for example by using excessive force, he will be
liable.2"'
It is arguable, however, that a governmental unit that damages prop-
erty in causing an arrest or in doing some similarly privileged act, ought
to be liable for a "taking" of property, if not for a "trespass," to the
extent that actual damage is done. However, there is no taking in a
constitutional sense if the government has only "regulated" the plain-
tiff's use of his property. 04 In a Georgia case, 0 5 officers entered the
plaintiff's land in the course of a murder investigation to search for a
body. They drained the plaintiff's lake, and in so doing, he alleged,
damaged his property to the extent of some 5,000 dollars. The Court of
Appeals of Georgia held that this was "regulation," or use of police
powers, not a "taking" and that the state was therefore not liable. Pre-
sumably the officers are privileged if they acted reasonably. The differ-
ence between a "taking," which is compensable, and a regulation or
exercise of police powers, which is not, is at most a matter of degree,
and to describe the conduct involved as "regulation" is only to symbolize
20. See generally RESTATEM ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 204-208 (1965); note
203 infra.
20' See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs, § 204, comment g (1965).
.0 State v. Mooring, 115 N.C. 709, 20 S.E. 182 (1894). Officers with a
warrant for the arrest of A sought to enter D's premises. D forbade entry and
said that A was not there. The officers broke in and D "drew an axe." D was
then charged with and found guilty of assault and battery. The conviction was
affirmed. Even though the officer was notified that A was not on the premises,
he might have good reason to think otherwise and was therefore reasonable in
entering. Since the entry was reasonable it was privileged, and because it was
privileged, D had no privilege to eject the officer or offer force.
'0 In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958), the
War Production Board had closed plaintiff's gold mines by administrative order,
but had not taken possession of them. The purpose was to re-allocate labor and
equipment to the mining of war-essential metals during World War II. The
Court held that, though "the form of regulation can so diminish the value of
property as to constitute a taking," the regulation here was not a "taking" and no
compensation was required. Id. at 168. See note 205 infra.
... McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga. App. 565, 148 S.E.2d 902 (1966).
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in a short way the conclusion that compensation need not be paid; it is
not to give a reason. It would seem desirable to require compensation
by governmental units when private property is actually damaged in the
course of investigations or arrests, even though the individual officers
should remain privileged. However, such a view has little judicial sup-
port at present, perhaps because the problem has not been a pressing
one quantitatively.
Similar to the arrest-investigation and related privileges is the privi-
lege to abate a nuisance.20 0 At least in extreme circumstances, a private
nuisance207 may be abated in a reasonable way and within a reasonable
time by the landowner who is victimized by it. But self-help is not
always justifiable merely because a nuisance in fact exists. The victim
must at least notify the creator of the nuisance that he intends abate-
ment if the creator does not himself abate it.20 8 Beyond this, the abate-
ment is justified only if it is reasonable; if the victim of the nuisance
has long lived with the nuisance, or moved to it, or if it is of a nature
to suggest that he might easily await the action of courts, it may well
be unreasonable to use self-help, and liability may be imposed. Since
entry upon another's land to abate a nuisance may lead to a breach of
the peace, the question whether it is reasonable to use self-help is tested
with some care.209
A public nuisance that causes no harm to the victim's land is never-
theless a real nuisance, and it may cause more harm to an individual
than to the public, as where defendant pollutes a public stream and thus
harms the plaintiff's commercial fishing rights in it.2 10 Where the indi-
vidual suffers special harm from the public nuisance, he is allowed to
abate it in a reasonable way and at a reasonable time.2  In State v.
Parrott,2" a railroad had built a bridge across the Neuse River, block-
ing boat traffic. Defendant had, several months before, notified the plain-
20 See generally RESTATE MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 201-03 (1965) (public
and private nuisances).
""
7As to the distinction between a private nuisance and a public one, see
Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
"
8 See State v. Brown, 191 N.C. 419, 132 S.E. 5 (1926). In that case defen-
dant was convicted of malicious injury to property because he had drained a
pond which was causing his road to flood. The conviction was affirmed in part
because, though he had advised the pond owners of his "predicament," he had
not advised that he would abate the nuisance.
209 See id.
. See Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538
(1943).211 Id.
271 N.C. 311 (1874).
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tiff of his need to have the bridge removed, and upon being delayed 30
hours at the bridge, removed a portion of it so that the boat could pass.
On these facts the defendant was acquitted of a charge of trespass. On
similar facts, in State v. Dibble,213 a defendant was allowed to remove
a portion of a bridge built by a county, since the bridge was a "public
nuisance" in blocking water traffic contrary to a statute. The court in
that case thought that the county court, in authorizing a bridge without
a "draw," had exceeded its jurisdiction and consequently thought that
the bridge it constructed could be a public nuisance subject to abatement.
The private individual's privilege to abate a public nuisance is usually
held to exist only if the public nuisance has focused upon the individual
so that his damage is substantially different in degree from the "public
harm."2 4 And the nuisance must in fact be actionable, or at least it
must threaten harm that is actionable in law or equity.215
Express or Implied Grant of Privilege by Statute
Statutes sometimes expressly grant a privilege to enter land. In one
kind of eminent domain in North Carolina, the governmental unit con-
demning land is given a statutory privilege to enter in advance for the
purpose of making surveys.21 ' The State Highway Department is given
a statutory privilege to enter land where necessary to carry out its as-
signed tasks, subject only to payment of any actual damages done, so
that it is not liable unless harm is done.21"
2"49 N.C. 107 (1856).
21 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) o Tomas § 203 (1965).
"'See, e.g., Hummel v. State, 69 Okla. Crim. 38, 99 P.2d 913 (1940) (only
when party is injured to such an extent as to give him a right of action). Humnzel
is an interesting case involving a rancher's effort to protect his cattle from a
scrub bull by converting him into "a handsome steer, that is, a bull that had lost
his social standing in the community in which he resided ... " Id. at 43, 99
P.2d at 916.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-33 (1966):
The petitioner may enter upon the land proposed to be acquired for the
purpose of making a survey and of posting any notice thereon which is
required by this article: Provided, that such survey and posting of notice
shall be done in such manner as will cause the least possible inconvenience
to the owners of the real property.
Some states with similar provisions add another requiring payment for any
actual damage done. See Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,
336 Mass. 54, 142 N.E.2d 389 (1957). Damages for actual harm are recoverable
under some other North Carolina statutes. See note 217 infra.
217N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-20 (1964) authorizes the Highway Department to
enter where necessary to carry out duties assigned and provided that such an
entry is not a "taking" or a "trespass," but that actual damages done in such
an entry are recoverable.
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In other situations, statutes may not be explicit, but may nevertheless
impliedly grant a privilege to enter. Presumably a statute means to
accord such privileges as are necessary to carry out duties assigned in
the statute itself. A statute authorizing execution upon property to en-
force a judgment or attachment before judgment clearly implies a privi-
lege in the officer to enter land where necessary to enforce the process
in his hands, though the rule is sometimes otherwise if the process under
which he acts is void or not fair on its face.
Free Speech
In limited situations, the United States Constitution may afford a
privilege to commit a technical trespass, though presumably it would not
afford a complete privilege to do physical harm. In Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,2"' union members picketed
a grocery located in a shopping center. Such picketing on public side-
walks can be regulated to avoid undue congestion or violence, but since
it involves communication protected by the Constitution, it cannot be
prohibited altogether. The same principle was applied to the privately
owned property in the Logan Valley Plaza case, where the Court held
that a flat prohibition against peaceful picketing would unduly infringe
the free-speech protection. But several limitations must be noticed.
First, the Court did not sanction a trespass that inflicted physical harm
to property, and presumably would not do so. Second, the shopping
center was open to the public generally, a fact noted by the Court.
Relatedly, the shopping center in American life today has, at least for
many suburbanites, supplanted the "downtown" shopping area with its
public walks available for picketing. Third, there was no reasonable
way for the picketers in Logan Valley Plaza to communicate to custom-
ers of the picketed establishment by using public areas outside the center.
Finally, there was neither violence nor chronic congestion of traffic. On
these facts, a free-speech privilege to commit a technical trespass exists.
On the other hand, this decision would not warrant a trespass inside the
supermarket itself, or in one's home, since neither place is customarily
open to the public without restriction.
218 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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